The Theory of Belief Safety and Response to Skepticism

Document Type : Original Article

Author

faculty of jame almostafa

Abstract

Justifying the beliefs is challenged based on two issues by skepticism tradition: the assumptions based on which justifying beliefs are impossible and the reasonable relationship between justifying a belief by negating the assumptions of skepticism based on the principle of closure. On the contrary to this problem, there are two epistemological solutions: the theory of sensitivity toward truth and the theory of belief safety. Rejecting the principle of closure of logical entailment relationship, the first viewpoint questions the relationship between negating skepticism assumptions and justifying the belief, while the second viewpoint by accepting the closure principle proposes its specific theories on justifying issue claims for negating skepticism assumptions. Suse's belief safety is categorized under this classification. According to this viewpoint, S's belief to P is safe only if it is not true and if P is not true, S believes in P. likewise, belief in P is safe given only when P is true that it is believed in. Accordingly, a belief is safe if it is not belied easily.

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References

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New Intellectual Research
Volume 3, Issue 6 - Serial Number 6
September 2019
Pages 117-135

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