Dilemma Defense and the Frankfort’s Solutions to it

Document Type : Original Article

Author

مدیر گروه و عضو هیئت علمی

Abstract

According to the principle of alternative possibilities, the agent has a moral responsibility for what he did only if he could have acted or decided otherwise. Contrary to this view, Frankfurt emphasizes that sometimes we encounter situations in which, although the person is not compelled to take action, it is impossible for him to avoid doing so, and yet we hold the agent morally responsible. The dilemma defense has been the philosophers' most important response to the Frankfurt model and the rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities in it and according to it, whether causal determinism is ruling among the phenomena or not, the Frankfurt’s claim does not come true and we cannot face an agent that is morally responsible for an action, while having no alternative at hand, because in the case of the lack of causal determinism, there is no necessary and predictable relationship between the previous evidence and movements of the agent and his subsequent choice and behavior. In fact, he still has before him the alternative possibility of avoiding a certain action, and in the case of necessity and causal determinism, the person's moral responsibility is not ruled out and does not become meaningless. Interfering brain process and contained obstruction are among Frankfurt's responses to this approach, which, of course, do not have the necessary efficiency in defending Frankfurt.

Keywords

References

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New Intellectual Research
Volume 6, Issue 11 - Serial Number 11
September 2021
Pages 131-153

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