Examining the criterion of numerical identity of the soul from the point of view of Descartes and Sadr al-Mutallah

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD student of Islamic Philosophy, Faculty of Moral Philosophy, Baqirul Uloom University, Qom

2 استادیار و عضو ه‍ییت علمی موسسه آموزشی پژوهشی امام خمینی ره، گروه فلسفه، رشته فلسفه غرب و فلسفه تطبیقی.

Abstract

The issue of personal identity is a wide-ranging issue. This research uses analytical-descriptive method to examine the criterion of numerical identity of the soul from the perspective of Descartes and Sadr al-Mutallah. Descartes considers the truth of man to be the soul and the soul to be the same thought. Although he considers the soul immortal and his view has the ability to continue the soul in two different times and answer the question of numerical similarity, but according to his works, it seems that he has not been able to explain the continuity of the soul (thought) and How to extend it at two different times. But Sadr al-Mutalahin, who believes in the movement of substance, has offered two solutions that can be used to maintain the stability and numerical similarity of the soul. One solution is a connection of existence that is weak, and the other solution is based on the motion of a non-continuous substance, which by stating that the soul in the second time is the same as the soul in the first time and not an extension of it, can be stable and this ‌ Explain the numerical identity of the soul in two different times.

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