Elucidating the Reasons for Moral Weakness in the Thoughts of Allama Tabataba’i and McNaughton

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 education. University of Maragheh

2 Director of Education Department of Payame Noor University

3 Assistant Professor of Light Message

Abstract

Based on his viewpoint of particularism as well as functionalism (in his own sense of the word), McNaughton believes that the elucidation of moral motivation as well as stating the reasons for moral weakness must be assessed on the basis of the situation in which the action takes place. He believes that when the person gets into a situation to act, he can have two kinds of perception of his situation: i.e., the general and the limited. He attributes the general perception of a situation to pious people and believes that if the person achieves a general perception, he would never get entangled in moral weakness. McNaughton has studied moral weakness in the field of limited perception and viewed such factors as the attractiveness of immoral acts, domination of sensation over reasoning and the immoral consideration being stronger as the causes for limited perception of the situation and moral weakness. On the other hand, Allama Tababtaba'i has also taken into consideration the person's perception of a situation in the formation of moral concepts and this very issue has provided the ground for a comparison of the two thinkers' opinions on elucidation of the reasons for moral weakness. Allama points out two types of general and limited perception, too. He attributes the general perception to the strongly faithful people and considers weakness of faith, voluntary ignorance, prioritizing pleasures of faculties of lust and anger, and weakness of determination (resulting from emotions, moral dispositions, and social atmosphere) as the reasons for weakness of faith. Consequently, both thinkers have pointed out two types of general and limited perception of situation concerning elucidation of moral weakness and have attributed general perception to pious people. They have also examined moral weakness concerning limited perception

Keywords

References

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