The Unification of the Soul with the Active Intellect in the Thought of Ibn Sīnā and Ṣadr al-Muti‘alihīn

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 جامعه المصطفی قم و پژوهشگر پژوهشگاه بین المللی المصطفی

2 ADX

Abstract

The issue of "unification of the soul with the active intellect" which has since long ago been the focus of attention of philosophers, especially the Aristotelians, has a direct effect on the series of epistemological functions of the active intellect. Through this research, it is clarified that Ibn Sīnā, by rejecting the absolute impossibility of the unification and the unification of the intelligent and the intelligible, does not accept the unification of the soul with the active intellect; but Ṣadr al-Muti‘alihīn, despite accepting the metamorphosis of the substantive and conceptual unification of the soul with the active intellect, accepts the existential unification of the soul with li ghayra (for-something-else) aspect of intellect as the unification of the non-actualized with the actualized and substantiates it. It seems that the focus of Ibn Sīnā's discussions is their essential unification, therefore it is not incompatible with Sadrian findings; whereas, on the other hand, some of the objections of the Neo-Sadrians are incorrect on Ṣadr al-Muti‘alihīn's view, which we have discussed in this article.

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