Objections Related to the Application of Natural Human Characteristics in Cognition (Related to Zagzebski's Theory)

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 َAssociate professor of the philosophy university of Mohaghegh Ardabili

2 Professor of islamic philosophy and theology, Payame noor university, Iran

Abstract

Linda Zagzebski's naturalistic approach to cognition has made permissible the entry of human virtue-oriented characteristics into the field of epistemology. Virtues, feelings, and emotions are aspects of human nature that, from Zagzebski's point of view, contribute to the formation of knowledge (ma‘rifat). The motivation arising from emotions leads the belief towards the truthfulness. The application of natural characteristics in knowledge requires a special skill, which, according to Zagzebski, is different from skill as a technique and mastery. Virtue, motivation and success are among the most important naturalistic components of cognition from Zagzebski's point of view. Besides the mentioned natural components, other elements are introduced by traditional epistemologists for the formation of knowledge, such as awareness, will, duty, etc.
In analyzing and criticizing Zagzebski's view, the authors deal with three natural components of knowledge, i.e. the elements of virtue, motivation and success. The three components, as proposed by Zagzebski, are not free from fault, and their application in the structure of knowledge requires precision in meaning, limits, and function. For example, if only epistemic and behavioral virtues are counted as effective virtues in cognition, there would appear a possibility of a conflict among virtues and the loss of the capacity of natural virtues in knowledge and the limitation of the scope of easy-to-find beliefs. In this case, the exclusiveness of true beliefs to the beliefs resulting from the truth-seeking motive would lead to neglecting the true beliefs arising from other motives, and the virtue of not having skills will cause the virtue hidden in techniques to disappear.

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