نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
علوم انسان، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه پردیس فارابی دانشگاه تهران، تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The relationship between unity and plurality, as one of the most fundamental philosophical questions, has always preoccupied thinkers and philosophers since long ago. In the meantime, Spinoza and Leibniz, as two prominent post-Cartesian rationalist philosophers, have each tried to find a suitable answer to this ancient dilemma. The following research, using a critical-comparative method, shows that Spinoza's approach to the issue of substance is monistic; in such a way that he considers God (i.e., the nature) to be the only infinite essence of the universe and considers other pluralities to lack true and independent existence and to be the manifestations of that single truth. He traces the root of the idea of plurality back in the imperfection of human perception and believes that if a person goes beyond the level of imaginary ideas and achieves rational intuition, he will see nothing but God. On the other hand, Leibniz, by denying the extension of the attributes of physical objects, rejects the existence of material substance and, in contrast, introduces the "monad" as an individual and true substance. He considers monads to be infinite and plural substances and, therefore, clearly takes the position of pluralism; however, the plurality that he depicts is compatible and reconcilable with the eternal unity (even despite his harsh criticisms of Spinoza's monism). According to Leibniz, although the world is composed of monads, what gives the world the appearance of contrast and plurality is nothing but the difference in the perceptual degrees of the monads themselves. Also, what causes humans to see monads in the form of objects is the deficiency in the perception of monads; and therefore, God, due to having a perfect perception, only perceives monads and never sees them in the form of objects like humans.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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