نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دکتری فلسفه اسلامی، گروه فلسفه و کلام، دانشکده فلسفه و اخلاق، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم علیه السلام، قم.
2 استادیار و عضو ه‍ییت علمی موسسه آموزشی پژوهشی امام خمینی ره، گروه فلسفه، رشته فلسفه غرب و فلسفه تطبیقی.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The issue of personal identity is one of the most widespread issues in philosophy. This research, using an analytical-descriptive method, examines the criterion of numerical identity of the soul from the perspective of Descartes and Ṣadr al-Muta‘alihīn. Descartes considers the truth of man to be the soul and the soul to be the same as thought. From his perspective, the soul is immortal, and although the perspective he proposes has the ability to continue the soul in two different times and to answer the question of numerical identity, according to his works, it seems that he has not been able to provide an explanation of the continuity of the soul (thought) and how it extends in two different times. In contrast, Ṣadr al-Muta‘alihīn, who believes in substantial movement, offers two solutions with which the stability and numerical identity of the soul can be maintained. One solution is existential connection, which has some weak points, but his other solution, based on non-extended substantial movement, can explain well the stability and numerical identity of the self in two different times by stating that the self in the second time is the same self as in the first time and not an extension of it.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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