عنوان مقاله [English]
One of the topics that has attracted the attention of philosophers and theologians is the “relation between the problem of hiddenness and the problem of evil.” The question is: “What is the relation between the problem of hiddenness and the problem of evil in terms of function and structure?” In other words, “Is the problem of hiddenness the same as the problem of evil?” In general, there are two main views on this relationship: Some thinkers reduce the problem of hiddenness to the problem of evil and consider it as an instance or version of the problem of evil. Others, including J.L. Schellenberg, emphasize the conceptual independence of the problem of hiddenness and evaluates it, at least conceptually, as distinct. John Schellenberg advocates the second view. In 1993 he formulated the argument of divine hiddenness as an atheistic argument, which is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In this paper, an attempt has been made to somehow show the strengths and weaknesses of each point of view by outlining and examining the possible relations between these two problems. Although Schellenberg’s arguments for proving the independence of the problem of hiddenness are somewhat significant, they are still insufficient and need further investigation.